Inflaming the Middle East
The Israeli-Palæstinian conflict is now more than sixty years old. It’s clear to all, but the most extreme nationalists (of both involved nations) or naïve idealists (globally) that the only viable solution, at least for the coming decades, would be a two-state division of what is currently Israel and its occupied territories. That is the plan. It would have been pretty straightforward to implement. But it doesn’t happen. Extremists on both sides make sure it doesn’t. Israel invokes the right to self-defence when attacking large parts of the Palæstinian (and now Lebanese) population and arab militants find excuses to launch their small and medium sized rockets to Israeli cities. Yet Israel and the arab extremists are not the sole parties to blame for their excessive actions over the past twenty years. It’s largely the fault of the U.N. and the international community that stands by while countless resolutions condemning both Israel’s actions get torpedoed by the U.S., generations of children on both sides grow among dead relatives and destruction, terrorist attacks continue in Israel fuelling religious extremism and nationalism. And there we go again.
Yet the events these past few days seem like breaking the trend of the past two decades. Israel’s reaction to the kidnapping of a couple of soldiers by Hesbollah and Palestinians is not just unwarranted, it’s not just excessive — it’s a joke. It’s hypocritical. A show of force, Olmert’s great chance to show his teeth and prove his worth to his people and the world.
Friends wrote [in Hellenic] of how lopsided the coverage of the recent crisis has been by mainstream media in the U.S. these past few days: two Israeli casualties get emotionally charged paragraphs while 60 Lebanese casualties are presented as a footnote: faceless, worthless beings lost for a good reason, perhaps. A rocket attack on Haifa by Hesbollah is a terrorist attack, yet a bombardment of Beirut killing dozens, destroying vital infrastructure is a honourable ‘precision-bombing’ done in self-defence to weed out terrorists.
The current attack by Israel is not merely provoking in its imbalance, it is also hypocritical. Sharon, once labelled a ‘butcher’ extremist, responsible for hundreds of deaths of innocents (Sabra, Shatila, Qibya, Unit 101), had little left to prove when he became prime minister of Israel. His late shift in policy, culminating in the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli presence in the Gaza strip, indicates his understanding of the need for concessions and respect between the two nations if peace is to be achieved, as opposed to constant destruction and retaliation. Olmert hasn’t. Despite his participation in Kadima, not as extreme a party as Netanyahu’s Likud, Olmert is keen to convince his colleagues (and the arabs) of his intention to be firm in protecting Israel, no matter what the cost to innocent people on the other side.
I feel that Israel and Palæstine cannot resolve their differences as it stands: nationalism, religious extremism, chronic hatred and humiliation, asymmetry of force, asymmetry of diplomatic and financial support. It has been a huge mistake, by the U.N., to allow Israel to attain complete control over Palæstine before the delimitation of two states was even conceived. It has been a much bigger mistake to allow Israel to acquire nuclear weapons and significant military capability — however justified that might have been considering the intentions of its neighbours. Had the U.N. divided up Palæstine, instigated a two-state division process with a buffer zone and a considerable resident U.N. force that would protect Israel and the Palæstinians from each other as well as third parties, had the international community (see a U.S. led UN) treated Palæstinians with the dignity it has treated the Israelis, there’d probably be much less blood, hatred and destruction in the Middle East. Instead it chose to ‘repay’ Jews with Palæstine and forget about what happened next. Olmert will need to come to his senses (or be forced to do so) faster than Sharon for the peace process to continue. Hesbollah would need to disarm. Internal politics, economic interests, and an increasingly inflamed situation will undoubtedly prohibit peace between all involved anytime soon. Until the international community steps in for real.
You are definitely right about the faults of the international community upon the foundation of the state of Israel. But I am not sure they could have done much more to improve the situation post-1950, especially in respect of creating a state for the Palestinians at those early stages.
It is only recently, I think, that some Arabs have come to reconcile themselves with the idea that Israel is there to stay -and that, consequently, it may be time to recognize its right to exist. A two-state solution would have sounded completely unacceptable to Palestinians and other Arabs in the 1950s or 60s. Don’t forget Barak’s (almost incredible) offer to Arafat, which the latter rejected with little hesitation in 2000 (some 50 years after the establishment of Israel).
Νικόλα, I do not think we can differentiate between UN policy pre and post 1950 with respect to Israel. The two are bound, related and continuous, and with the exception of Marshall’s refusal to acknowledge Israel in 1948, it has been more or less consistent: support for Israel by the States, indifference by the rest.
Now, I think the basis of your argument on the popular opinion among arabs is wrong — although you are correct in pointing out the obvious; I do not feel that the actual treatment of the issue between 1950-today by the international community helped arabs in any way overcome their problems with Israel; on the contrary, it has accentuated them by depriving a large part of them of humaine living conditions and exposing them to constant use of force. Note that even ‘labour’ politicians, such as Barak, abused Israel’s ‘defensive’ capability. The asymmetry of force is not something new or unique. The treatment of the situation could have been handled much better throughout the 20th century, if the international community cared.
In my article, and here, I argue that the UN has not done much to protect the palæstinians or Israel, the US has done (and is doing) everything it could to support Israel in building a formidable arsenal. That’s only reasonable when the UN is absent. In my opinion both should not have been the case. The UN should have engaged with Israel and the Palæstinians in an arbitrating role much earlier and more substantially and should have avoided such imbalance of power in the region.
I believe it is due to Europe’s post-WW2 inability, the UK’s intention to wash their hands of the whole affair immediately after the expiration of the Mandate, the US dominance of the international politics for 60 odd years that has long favoured Israel, that we’ve reached this situation. The 1947 partition plan never went through because of the arabs. Yet, I think forcing the arabs to accept Israel’s place in the middle east then, without casualties, without war, with an active and significant UN force would have been easier than solving the problem today. If the US can pay Israel $2bn per annum in military aid they could have certainly covered the cost of a UN force there. More to the point, Israel is now in a position to refuse UN active involvement (in the form of troops or even observers) as Barak’s refusal in 2000 has shown.
Finally, I am not adequately informed, besides the media coverage at the time and a few sources online since, — it’s too early to have historical information anyway — about what really happened in Camp David in 2000. The topic is controversial and there has been a lot of discussion about it. Wikipedia mentions Clayton Swisher’s book, “The Truth About Camp David” that portrays a different picture to the one presented by the media (and both the US and Israeli sides) at the time, placing the blame on both parties, instead of just Arafat. I haven’t read it.
I have no problem with the view that ‘the UN has not done much to protect the palæstinians or Israel, the US has done (and is doing) everything it could to support Israel in building a formidable arsenal.’ I also agree that ‘The UN should have engaged with Israel and the Palæstinians in an arbitrating role much earlier.’
Yet I don’t think there is much more that the UN could have done. In 1948 everyone in the region, save America and Israel, were, as far as I know, more or less convinced that Israel would soon be wiped off the map. Had the Americans not supported the Israelis post 1948 in the way they did, the country would surely have been run down.
Of course this is not to say that they did enough to find a two-state solution. That’s why I subscribe to your remarks to the effect that ‘they did not do enough’. But given the hostility of Arabs -and others in the region, but also in the international community- I highly doubt more could have been achieved.
These are all speculations, and I am no expert in the field. I have not read the book you cited. I do, however, know that Barak offered Arafat most of East Jerusalem, common ‘custodianship’ of Temple Mount and a return to pre-1967 borders for most of Israel’s settlements. The rejection of this offer is no evidence that Arafat didn’t want a settlement, but it is evidence that things are still very, very difficult, almost 60 years after the establishment of Israel.
Well, let us not forget that the territories are not part of Israel. They are occupied territories pending the resolution of the two-state solution.
Regarding what countries thought of Israel back in the day, I tend to believe that Europe had too much on its plate post WW2 to really bother with Israel. The UK, the country that was largely responsible for the collapse of the 1947 UN partition plan — in typical British fashion — literally washed its hands of Palæstine the moment the mandate expired — or rather a bit earlier, when Israel declared the establishment of its state. I am not justifying Europe\’s position, but it is clear to me that post WW2, European States had explicitly, in all possible ways resigned from their colonial status and, by extension, their superpower status.
Now, I agree that the arabs were always hostile, and I cannot entirely blame them: Europe and the US had decided to take 55% of the land of Palæstine away from them for no good reason (at least from their point of view). There was no way their feelings were going to change overnight — at least in the early years. The problem is how you deal with it.
As I have already written, the UN could have adopted a very different position by actively engaging with the region. I never argued that Israel didn\’t need the military aid to defend itself, as long as there was no UN presence — yet we still have this imbalance that has caused so many problems and rooted hatred in the hearts of so many people whose relatives and friends died unjustly. I feel active engagement, through balanced incentives/financial aid to the Israelis and the Palæstinians to develop their countries and subdue hatred would have helped. I cannot but feel that the continuation of discussions along the lines of the 1947 UN partition plan would have — sooner or later — resulted in an acceptable solution to both parties. Even if Israel ended up with less than the 55% originally alloted to it. UN military presence would have helped too. A generous financial package to the Palæstinians would definitely have helped change their minds.
In any case, speculation is pointless when it comes to history; sadly, it is also very fascinating. Thanks for the comments.