Securing the EU — Theory and practice

I read today an article about the dangers that security research will bring to the EU, not just at the institutional, but mostly at the civil level, through the corrosion of fundamental rights and freedoms (often by stealth), the waste of public funds, the unaccountability associated with unaudited (and considerable) powers given to commercial entities tasked with providing security infrastructure and the list goes on. I find myself largely agreeing with Talos, the author of that article; however I am obliged to observe a distinction between the theoretical need for security infrastructure in Europe, as opposed to lack thereof and the way in which this is designed, implemented and deployed. Talos’ article, though accurate, seems to be dismissing the former as a whole, through the (valid) flaws of the latter. He provides a very lopsided view of the subject and seems to dismiss the idea of any sort of security research whatsoever. With this I disagree, not necessarily because I am a proponent of security research, but rather because I do not find his concoction justified.

Despite the opposing views of what the essence and role of the EU is between several of its members, the EU today is unquestionably somewhere between a free trade bloc and a political entity. Its powers extend to (and supercede to a large extent) the definition of member state legislation, foreign and trade policy, human rights, arbitration etc. While the EU (and to a larger degree its member states) is theoretically sovereign, there is, and always has been, considerable pressure on, and control of, distinctly European matters by the United States, more so than in other places, a remnant perhaps of the post-WWII political, military and economic situation that allowed the US to effectively run Europe for decades.
Yet, the rapid integration of European states into the quasi-political bloc of the past fifteen years has — in many ways — amplified the European views on issues and exposed differences and shaken the balance once struck between Europe and the US — this has recently been evident in trade differences (see the Airbus/Boeing or the Microsoft vs. EC disputes), foreign policy (Iraq war, War on Terror) and environmental policy (Kyoto). Europe wants and needs its own say on many critical issues including the environment, education and culture. Although not a token of an advanced society, I find ‘security’ necessary for Europe if it is to retain (or amplify) its say on subjects that matter.
For the sake of well-formedness let me clarify that security, contrary to Talos’ definition, refers to military and law enforcement capability, not environmental or social policy — those are very different and distinct fields and should not be confused
I subscribe to the opinion that the EU seems to have lost track of its priorities and ideals as of late be it through the rushed and badly planned enlargement of 2004, the lack of transparency in the functions of the Commission, the indifference of the people, a combination of the above etc. Most of the concerns mentioned by Statewatch (and Talos in his article) are absolutely valid, in that the current implementation of a Security Research Programme compromises the very ideal they are trying to protect, in a way similar to the one where U.S. legislators managed to infringe on their people’s right time and again in the post ’11th September’ world.
I am not, however, convinced that as a society, Europe is fundamentally in no need of any security infrastructure, capability and policy (framework) whatsoever. I tend to believe that Europe needs to find a balance, its place in the world and to this end it probably requires some sort of security capability, albeit one that would need to be in compliance with the European Law and ideals and not against them.