According to RTÉ, the Lisbon Treaty has been rejected by the Irish people after yesterday’s referendum.
This is not a Maastricht-type rejection. It is not even a 2005-type rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands. This is something completely different; it is a rejection stemming from the fact that during the process of drafting, approving and signing both the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, no one seemed to care what people think; no one felt that it is necessary to inform the public and include it in the decision-making process. The rejection of the Treaty by the Irish is underlined by and a testament of the hastiness and complete lack of proper planning in which the 2004 and 2007 expansions to Eastern Europe (the Nice Treaty), the Constitution and now the Lisbon Treaty took place: quick, hastened and with insufficient planning and analysis of its consequences to the EU as a quasi-political entity and a multinational organisation. Most importantly, with minimal public consultation on the topics that matter to everyone, with practically no public involvement whatsoever. It is no accident that most of the arguments of the No campaign in Ireland had to do with topics that people were concerned with, that the Treaty addresses, but which were not communicated to them by the authorities.
This is not a unique situation to Ireland. I’m pretty certain that if more referenda took place, there’d be much more dissent than expected; even from those in favour of a stronger Union. Those arguing that an Irish ‘No’ should be translated in an expulsion of Ireland from the Union, forget that — besides this being totally unrealistic — it could very well be the case that their country too, had it had voted in a referendum, might have said no. The French suggestion that during the French presidency all the ‘important’ parts of the Treaty would be ratified in an ‘ad-hoc way’ are indications that the result of the referendum are not only misunderstood, but ignored; the EU has managed to create a relatively dangerous deadlock and one that cannot — easily, within the existing frameworks and norms — be broken.
Most people in Europe are still unfamiliar with the text of the treaty; national media rarely provide reports — or even a discussion — of its content; most governments simply don’t care; after all, no country other than Ireland gets to vote in a referendum. The precedent of the second referendum in Ireland in 2001 regarding the Treaty of Nice and the fact that no other country had a referendum on Lisbon means that it will not be so easy to move on from here on; at least not in a transparent, acceptable way, even to the same politicians from the 26 member states that would have signed the treaty.
Sadly, since 2004 the EU as an organisation has undergone a vast geopolitical — almost cultural — change, while its organisational and institutional frameworks and structures remained unchanged. The Lisbon Treaty was about changing all that. It’s thus ironic that an Irish rejection (along with 26 approvals in the respective parliaments of the remaining EU member states) proves why the organisational restructuring of the EU should have preceded its expansion (if not evolution) into a 27-state chaotic entity.
Nevertheless, while really unfortunate for the EU, the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty — like those of the Constitution three years earlier — is probably going to be followed by a secondary solution, perhaps another referendum coupled with minor adjustments to the Treaty, a more opaque solution with a mini-Treaty with merely the absolutely necessary parts for the operational reform and an eventual ‘approval’ of a much larger treaty when the time is ripe. Still, it seems to me that today’s rejection should serve as a reminder that if the european project is to succeed, it really needs to include its most significant members: its citizens. Otherwise it won’t be long until the EU dissolves into a sad reminder of what could’ve been the most prosperous and democratic era for the continent and beyond.
